First Punic War

Багерман А.Я.

The First Punic War of 264-241 BCE began as a struggle between Rome and Carthage for Sicily. Rome was a land power, but built a fleet, learned naval warfare and after a long conflict gained its first overseas province.

In brief:

• the main theatre was Sicily and the surrounding sea;
• Rome built a large fleet and used boarding tactics;
• the result was Carthaginian defeat and Sicily passing to Rome.

The Punic Wars were three wars between the Roman Republic and Carthage: 264–241, 218–201 and 149–146 BCE. Carthage developed from a Phoenician settlement into an independent Mediterranean power.

The Romans called the Carthaginians Punic. The Latin names Punicus and Poenus are connected with the name of the Phoenicians, not with a profession selling shellfish or producing purple dye.

Alignment of forces before the war

The immediate occasion was the conflict over Messana in Sicily. Mamertines, former mercenaries of Agathocles, had seized the city and sought support from Carthage and Rome under pressure from Hiero II of Syracuse. Roman intervention in 264 BCE opened a struggle for the island.

The early Roman–Carthaginian treaties are disputed. Polybius rejected the existence of a treaty excluding Roman intervention in Sicily, so violation of an alleged agreement of 306 should not be presented as an undisputed fact.

Rome fielded citizen legions and Italian allied contingents. It possessed maritime forces before the war, but building a large fleet represented a new scale of effort. Carthage had an established naval organisation and used forces drawn from citizens, subject communities, allies and mercenaries.

Roman commanders included Appius Claudius Caudex, Gaius Duilius, Marcus Atilius Regulus, Publius Claudius Pulcher and Gaius Lutatius Catulus. Hanno, Hamilcar Barca and other commanders led Carthaginian forces; Hiero II became Rome’s ally in 263 BCE.

Course of the war

Roman troops crossed to Sicily in 264 BCE. Alliance with Hiero II in 263 and the capture of Agrigentum in 262 strengthened their position. Rome began large-scale fleet construction to confront Carthage.

Gaius Duilius won at Mylae in 260 BCE. The naval victory at Cape Ecnomus occurred in 256, not also in 260. It enabled an expedition to Africa, but Regulus’ campaign ended in defeat in 255.

Rome captured Panormus in 254. The siege of Lilybaeum began in 250, and the Roman fleet suffered a major defeat at Drepana in 249. Lilybaeum and Drepana were not stormed in 242: they remained Carthaginian strongholds until the peace.

Hamilcar Barca continued resistance in Sicily. The Roman naval victory at the Aegates Islands in 241 made supplying his army extremely difficult and led to negotiations. Carthage relinquished its Sicilian holdings, returned prisoners and accepted an indemnity.

Last Battles of the war

Fighting again unfolded in Sicily-the Punians recaptured Acragantus and equipped a new fleet of 200 ships. The Romans also built a fleet of 220 ships. After that, taking advantage of their numerical superiority, the Romans began to push the Carthaginians hard in Sicily, recapturing Acragantus and conquering Panormus (now Palermo). The Romans again tried to move the war to Africa, but the Carthaginian fleet ran the Roman fleet aground, where a storm destroyed 150 ships, and after such losses, the Senate left only a 60-ship fleet to defend the coast. In 251 BC, the Battle of Panormus took place. The Consul Caecilius provoked the enemy to battle. Initially, he pretended to be unsure of himself. He held the troops in Panorm and made a huge ditch in front of his camp. According to Polybius, the lightly armed Romans disturbed the enemy until Hasdrubal lined up the entire army (30 thousand soldiers and 130 elephants). The Romans then retreated to the wall and moat. In addition, Caecilius deliberately placed few defenders on the walls to give the Carthaginians confidence. The Carthaginians approached the city. The Romans fired at the elephants, and when they attacked, they took cover behind the moat. Here the elephants came under heavy fire from the wall and from behind the moat. Caecilius stood outside the gate against the Carthaginian left flank and constantly sent reinforcements to his troops outside the city. Blacksmiths regularly brought out new throwing weapons and placed them outside at the base of the wall. The elephants fled and broke the ranks of the Carthaginian army. Fresh Roman forces came out of the city, hit the flank and achieved a complete victory. The attack was launched from all the gates of the city, the Carthaginians were surrounded, many tried to swim to the ships and drowned. The Romans offered freedom to those captives who caught the runaway elephants. The Numidian prisoners agreed to do this. 120 elephants were captured. As a result of this battle, the Carthaginians lost 20 thousand people. Encouraged by their success, the following year the Romans attempted to capture the Carthaginian fortress of Lilybaeum (now the city of Marsala). A fleet of 200 ships and a 40,000-strong Roman army unsuccessfully besieged it for a long time, but never succeeded. In 249 BC, the Battle of Drepana (now the city of Trapani) took place. Consul Claudius had 120-210 ships. The Romans entered the harbor, hoping to surprise the enemy, but this was not successful. The Carthaginian admiral Atarbalus managed to put mercenaries on ships and slipped out of the harbor, following the southern side of the city, located on the cape. He passed through the strait between Drepansky Cape and the rocky islets and rounded the islands from the west. Part of the Roman fleet was in the bay, others were on the way. When trying to get out of the harbor into the sea, there was confusion. Only a part of the Roman ships managed to line up facing west and with their backs to the shore. The Carthaginians, pressing the enemy to the shore, began to attack. Atharbalus led the right flank, which was opposed by Claudius. The maneuverability of the ships and the skill of the Carthaginian rowers allowed Atarbalus to impose his tactics on the Romans. The Carthaginians bypassed and rammed enemy ships, ran them aground, and if the Romans tried to board them, quickly retreated to sea. Claudius with 30 ships of the left flank managed to break through along the coast to the south, from 93 to 137 Roman ships were captured by the Carthaginians, although the crews of the stranded ships fled,8-20 thousand people died,20-50 thousand were captured. Soon, the remnants of the Roman fleet were destroyed in a new battle by the Carthaginian fleet and a storm, with Rome's losses amounting to 150 ships. The period 248-242 BC is characterized by an extreme depletion of the forces of both sides, but the initiative gradually began to pass to Rome. In Sicily, Hamilcar became the new commander-in-chief of Carthage, replacing the previous commander-in-chief of Cartalon. During this period, Hamilcar managed to repel Roman attacks on Lilybaeum and Drepani, launch a counterattack in the Panormus area, and make several daring raids deep into Sicily and southern Italy. For his rapid actions, he received the nickname " Barca "(in Phoenician"Lightning"). These successes allowed the Punians to gain hope of winning the war, but in the future, the fighting was sluggish, which almost did not solve anything. In 242 BC, a new fleet was built in Rome at the private expense of citizens — 200 penter. But these ships were lighter than the usual Roman quinquirems. The Romans were preparing for a decisive battle over the sea. They weren't going to rely on boarding tactics alone anymore. Sailors and rowers trained daily. At the same time, the situation of the Carthaginians in Sicily became threatening due to the lack of provisions in Lilybeia and Drepani, so it was decided to equip a flotilla to help the citizens and the Sicilian army of Hamilcar Barca. Hanno was put in charge of the fleet. The preparation of the Carthaginian flotilla was not focused on a naval battle with the Romans, so a significant part of the ships consisted of merchant transport ships that were not intended for naval combat. In addition, the Carthaginians, because of the lack of trained rowers, put untrained people on the oars. In 241 BC, the Battle of the Aegates Islands took place between these fleets. The Punic fleet of 250 ships could not resist the Romans and was defeated-the losses were 50 ships sunk and 70 captured, the Romans lost 30 ships sunk and 50 damaged. Carthage was filled with a desire to avenge this defeat, but it simply did not have the means to continue the war. In addition, after the defeat, the fate of the army of Hamilcar Barca and the cities of Lilybay and Drepana hung in the balance due to the lack of pay for mercenaries and the acute shortage of food.

Results

The Carthaginian Government granted Hamilcar Barca extraordinary powers to conduct peace negotiations. They were completed on fairly good terms for Carthage (the People's assembly in Rome initially refused to ratify them). Under the terms of the peace Treaty of Carthage: - he completely abandoned Sicily, which became a Roman possession - paid 3,200 talents of contribution for 10 years - paid a small ransom for his Sicilian army - The demand to hand over the defectors and hand over their weapons to the Sicilian army was rejected Rome's victory was made possible by superior resources — during the war, ship losses were 700 and 500 (for Rome and Carthage, respectively). By the end of the war, the Roman army, consisting of militias, had become experienced and sufficiently professional, while the Carthaginian mercenary army often showed its inadequacy due to the lack of generalship skills of most Carthaginian generals and their inability to command a multilingual army, as well as due to the unreliability of mercenaries, which for the most part consisted of the Carthaginian army (in particular, mercenaries were prone to mutiny or desertion due to the slightest delay in pay). Finally, Rome showed its willingness to go to the end and not stop at any sacrifice for the sake of victory. The reserves of Carthage, which relied on mercenary armies, were exhausted faster. Carthaginian citizens were less likely to make material sacrifices than the Romans. The inability to support large armies made it impossible to use boarding combat at sea on a large scale — this would lead to the exposure of the land front. The fleet used ramming tactics, which required great skill of the crews. In the interval between the 1st and 2nd Punic wars, the Romans managed to capture the islands of Sardinia and Corsica from Carthage, taking advantage of the fact that Carthage was waging a war with its rebellious mercenaries (240-238 BC). After its completion, Carthage tried to regain Sardinia and Corsica, but Rome threatened war, unprepared for a new war, Carthage chose to pay the Romans another 1,200 talents, in addition to 3,200 talents of indemnity. Carthage managed to recoup the loss of Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica by establishing a number of colonies in Spain. Thus, Hamelcar and Hasdrubal were able to subordinate the south and east of Spain to the power of Carthage. The wealth of Spain (silver mines) helped make up for Carthage's monetary losses due to the First Punic War and the war with mercenaries. One of the major centers of Carthage in Spain was the city of New Carthage (today it is the city of Cartagena in Spain). Rome drew attention to the strengthening of Carthage in Spain and made an alliance with the Greek cities of Saguntum (today the city of Sagunto in Spain) and Emporia in Spain, and also demanded that the Carthaginians do not cross the Ebro River (a river in the north-east of the Iberian Peninsula).

Related topics

• Roman Republic
• Second Punic War
• The Third Punic War
• Punics
• Punic Wars: Rome and Carthage

Literature and sources

Ancient authors: 1. Polybius. Universal History. 2. Titus Livy. Roman history from the founding of the city 3. Appian of Alexandria. Roman history 4. Plutarch. Comparative biographies Contemporary authors: 1. Revyako K. K. Punic wars. Minsk: Universitetskoe Publ.,1988,272 p. (in Russian) 2. Rodionov E. Punicheskie voyny [Punic Wars]. St. Petersburg: SPBU Publishing House,2005. (Res militaris) 3. Bagnall, Nigel. The Punic Wars: Rome, Carthage and the Struggle for the Mediterranean. — London: Pimlico,1999 4. Punic Politics, Economy, and Alliances,218–201 // A Companion to the Punic Wars / Hoyos, Dexter. — Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell,2011. 5. Shifman I. I. Carthage. Saint Petersburg: Saint Petersburg University Press. 2006 6. Delbrueck H. The history of military art in the framework of political history. — Translated from German-Vol. 1 "The Ancient world". - Moscow,1936. 7. Eliseev M. B. The Second Punic War. - Moscow: Veche,2018. - 480 p.: ill. - Series "Antique world". 8. Mashkin N. A. The last century of Punic Carthage / / VDI. - 1949. - No. 2. 9. Herbert William Park. Greek mercenaries. Dogs of War of ancient Greece / Translated from English by L. A. Igorevsky. - Moscow: ZAO "Tsentrpoligraf",2013. - 288 p. 10. Warmington B.-H. Carthage. — L.,1960. 11. Mayak I. L. Sotsial'no-politicheskaya borba italiyskikh obshchestvov v period Gannibalovoy voyny [Socio-political struggle of Italian communities during the Hannibal War]. 12. Shifman I. S. Vozrozhdenie karfagenskoi derzhavy [The Emergence of the Carthaginian Power]. 13. Elnitsky L. A. The emergence and development of slavery in Rome in the VIII-III centuries BC-Moscow,1964.

• Polybius. Histories, Book I