Second Punic War

Багерман А.Я.

The Second Punic War of 218-201 BCE was the decisive struggle between Rome and Carthage. Hannibal crossed the Alps and won at Cannae, but Rome kept its alliances, carried the war into Africa and defeated Carthage at Zama.

In brief:

• the leading Carthaginian commander was Hannibal;
• the turning point came through attrition and Scipio's campaigns;
• the outcome was Roman dominance in the western Mediterranean.

The biography of Hannibal Barca shows how his decisions connected the Iberian, Italian and African theatres of the war.

The Punic Wars were three wars between the Roman Republic and Carthage: 264–241, 218–201 and 149–146 BCE. Carthage developed from a Phoenician settlement into an independent Mediterranean power.

The Romans called the Carthaginians Punic. The Latin names Punicus and Poenus are connected with the name of the Phoenicians, not with a profession selling shellfish or producing purple dye.

Alignment of forces before the war

The peace of 241 BCE ended the First Punic War. Carthage lost its Sicilian possessions and owed an indemnity. During the subsequent Mercenary War, Rome seized Sardinia and demanded an additional payment. These events deepened distrust but did not in themselves make another war inevitable.

Hamilcar Barca expanded Carthaginian holdings in the Iberian Peninsula. His successor Hasdrubal founded New Carthage, an important administrative and commercial centre with a convenient harbour. Spanish resources, including silver mines, strengthened the Barcids’ military and financial base. In 226 BCE, after Hamilcar’s death, Hasdrubal reached an agreement with Rome: the Carthaginians undertook not to cross the Ebro for military purposes. This was not an agreement concluded under Hamilcar or a complete partition of the peninsula between two powers. Rome’s relations with Saguntum, south of the Ebro, became an important source of tension.

At the time of his father's death, Hannibal was seventeen years old. According to subsequent events, he left Spain with his brothers Mago and Hasdrubal and returned to Carthage. The atmosphere of the military camp, participation in campaigns, and observation of the diplomatic activities of his father and brother-in-law undoubtedly had a decisive impact on his formation as a commander and statesman.

Hannibal knew Greek language and culture; his connections with Greek advisers and writers appear in ancient accounts. These reports do not establish his entire educational programme or his father’s political intentions. Stories of a Carthaginian prohibition on learning Greek concern earlier circumstances and do not prove that Hannibal’s education directly violated a law then in force. Barcid contacts with the Hellenistic world accompanied the consolidation of their position in Spain.

And Hannibal returned to Spain, where, thanks to his personal qualities, he became very popular in the army — after the death of Hasdrubal, the soldiers chose him as commander-in-chief.

When Hannibal came to power, he was twenty-five years old. Carthaginian rule in Spain was firmly established, and the southern part of the Iberian Peninsula seemed a safe springboard for an attack on Rome. Hannibal himself developed the traditional Barcid connection to the Iberian world: he was married to an Iberian woman from the Carthaginian-allied city of Castulo. He immediately acted as if the war with Rome had already been decided and entrusted to him, and Italy was assigned to his sphere of activity. Hannibal seems to have made no secret of his intention to attack Saguntum, which was allied to the Romans, and thereby involve Rome in a direct conflict, but at the same time he tried to pretend that the attack on Saguntum would occur naturally, as a result of natural events. To this end, he won a series of victories over the Spanish tribes living on the border of the northern possessions of Carthage and went directly to the borders of the Sagunta region. Despite the fact that Saguntum was a Roman ally, Hannibal could count on the non-intervention of Rome, which was busy fighting Gauls and Illyrian pirates. Having provoked conflicts between Saguntum and the Iberian tribes under Punic rule, he intervened in the conflict and, under a minor pretext, declared war. After a difficult eight-month siege, the city was taken, and Rome did not dare to provide military assistance to Saguntum, only the embassy sent to Carthage after the capture of the city directly announced the beginning of the war. Before going to Italy, Hannibal gave the army a rest for the whole winter. He paid serious attention to the defense of Africa and Spain. In Africa, Hannibal left 13,750 infantry and 1,200 horsemen recruited in Spain, and 870 Balearic slingers were sent there. Carthage itself was further reinforced with a garrison of 4,000. Hannibal appointed his brother Hasdrubal to command the Punic forces in Spain and placed at his disposal a considerable military force: infantry-11,850 Libyans,300 Ligurs,500 Balearics, and horsemen-450 Liby-Phoenicians and Libyans,300 Ilergetes,800 Numidians. In addition, Hasdrubal had 21 elephants and a fleet of 50 quinqueremes, two quadriremes and five triremes to defend the coast from Roman invasion from the sea.

After crossing the Pyrenees, the army consisted of approximately 50,000 infantry,9,000 horsemen, and 37 elephants. Meanwhile, the Romans were also preparing for war. Consul Tiberius Sempronius Longus had 24,000 infantry,2,400 horsemen, and 160 ships; the Second Consul, Publius Cornelius Scipio, had 22,000 infantry and 2,200 horsemen. Rome's army in Gaul, under the Praetor Lucius Manlius, numbered 18,000 infantry and 1,600 horsemen. In all, the Roman army numbered 64,000 infantry and 6,200 cavalry-slightly more than Hannibal had. A significant advantage of the Romans was that they had to fight at home and for them to mobilize additional military contingents was easier than for a Punic general to receive reinforcements. It is impossible, however, not to see the dispersion of the Roman army, and the lack of a single command, which, of course, made it difficult for the Romans to conduct combat operations. Fortunately for Carthage, Hannibal was a military genius.

Rome and Carthage contested influence in the western Mediterranean. The Barcids’ Spanish holdings and the dispute over Saguntum were important factors. Hannibal intended to bring war into Italy and disrupt Rome’s alliances. Rome already possessed a fleet after the First Punic War and could operate in several theatres while replacing losses with citizen and allied recruits.

Carthaginian forces included African, Spanish, Numidian and other contingents. Commanders included Hannibal, Hasdrubal and Mago Barca, Hasdrubal son of Gisco and others. Numidian rulers Syphax and Masinissa changed alliances during the conflict; Philip V of Macedon agreed an alliance with Hannibal in 215 BCE.

Major Roman commanders included Publius and Gnaeus Scipio, Tiberius Sempronius Longus, Gaius Flaminius, Quintus Fabius Maximus, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, Gaius Claudius Nero and Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus. Their actions should be distinguished by date and theatre.

Course of the war

Hannibal’s capture of Saguntum in 219 BCE provided the immediate occasion for war. In 218 he crossed the Pyrenees and Alps into Italy, suffering severe losses. Carthaginian victories at the Ticinus and Trebia followed that year.

In 217 Gaius Flaminius’ army was defeated at Lake Trasimene. Hannibal lost an eye through illness while crossing marshland in Italy, not during the Alpine crossing. Appointed dictator, Fabius Maximus avoided a decisive battle and tried to wear down the enemy.

Hannibal won at Cannae in 216. Consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus was killed, but Gaius Terentius Varro survived. Some allies, including Capua, defected afterwards; the Roman alliance system did not collapse completely. Rome continued recruiting and operating in Italy, Spain and Sicily.

Marcellus captured Syracuse in 212; Rome recovered Capua in 211. Publius and Gnaeus Scipio died in Spain in 211. The new commander, Publius Cornelius Scipio, arrived in 210 and captured New Carthage in 209.

After Baecula in 208, Hasdrubal Barca marched towards Italy but was defeated and killed at the Metaurus in 207 without joining Hannibal. Rome strengthened its position in Spain with victory at Ilipa in 206.

Scipio landed in Africa in 204. Victories over Carthaginian forces and Syphax, support from Masinissa and the threat to Carthage led to Hannibal’s recall in 203. Scipio and Masinissa defeated him at Zama in 202; peace followed in 201 BCE.

Results

The peace of 201 BCE deprived Carthage of its Spanish holdings, drastically limited its fleet and prohibited independent external warfare. Even military action in Africa required Rome’s consent. The indemnity was 10,000 talents over 50 years; Carthage retained only ten warships.

Hannibal participated in Carthaginian government after the war, then left under threat of Roman intervention. He eventually died in Bithynia, choosing suicide rather than surrender to Rome.

Carthage restored trade and economic activity but remained constrained by the treaty and pressure from Masinissa. Rome meanwhile strengthened its influence in Greece and Asia Minor. It had not annexed all Greece and Syria before the Third Punic War: the province of Syria was created only in 64 BCE.

Related topics

• Roman Republic
• The First Punic War
• The Third Punic War
• Punics
• Punic Wars: Rome and Carthage

Literature and sources

Ancient authors: 1. Polybius. Universal History. 2. Titus Livy. Roman history from the founding of the city 3. Appian of Alexandria. Roman history 4. Plutarch. Comparative biographies Contemporary authors: 1. Revyako K. K. Punic wars. Minsk: Universitetskoe Publ.,1988,272 p. (in Russian) 2. Rodionov E. Punicheskie voyny [Punic Wars]. St. Petersburg: SPBU Publishing House,2005. (Res militaris) 3. Bagnall, Nigel. The Punic Wars: Rome, Carthage and the Struggle for the Mediterranean. — London: Pimlico,1999 4. Punic Politics, Economy, and Alliances,218–201 // A Companion to the Punic Wars / Hoyos, Dexter. — Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell,2011. 5. Shifman I. I. Carthage. Saint Petersburg: Saint Petersburg University Press. 2006 6. Delbrueck H. The history of military art in the framework of political history. — Translated from German-Vol. 1 "The Ancient world". - Moscow,1936. 7. Eliseev M. B. The Second Punic War. - Moscow: Veche,2018. - 480 p.: ill. - Series "Antique world". 8. Mashkin N. A. The last century of Punic Carthage / / VDI. - 1949. - No. 2. 9. Herbert William Park. Greek mercenaries. Dogs of War of ancient Greece / Translated from English by L. A. Igorevsky. - Moscow: ZAO "Tsentrpoligraf",2013. - 288 p. 10. Warmington B.-H. Carthage. — L.,1960. 11. Mayak I. L. Sotsial'no-politicheskaya borba italiyskikh obshchestvov v period Gannibalovoy voyny [Socio-political struggle of Italian communities during the Hannibal War]. 12. Shifman I. S. Vozrozhdenie karfagenskoi derzhavy [The Emergence of the Carthaginian Power]. 13. Elnitsky L. A. The emergence and development of slavery in Rome in the VIII-III centuries BC-Moscow,1964.

• Polybius. Histories, Book III