The formation of the oligarchic movement was a reaction to the intensive socio-political and economic development of the Athenian polis, as a result of which the influence of the aristocracy in Athens greatly declined in the first half of the fifth century BC.
If the main form of association of the aristocracy was a clan, all members of which were connected by blood and cult ties, then for the supporters of the oligarchy, the core of which was made up of representatives of the aristocracy, who largely preserved the same customs and values, the main thing was to belong to a group of like - minded people-hetaeria or a large party bloc. The principle of corporatism was the defining one for the Athenian oligarchic movement.
Thucydides writes that of the successors of Pericles, not one was distinguished among the others as a statesman, but each aspired to primacy and was ready to indulge the people, even to sacrifice the interests of the state. In the" Horsemen " of Aristophanes, a peculiar list of politicians who headed the people's Party is given. In the prophecy of Bakid, merchants are consistently listed: hemp, cattle, and leather. The first is Eucrates, the second is Lycicles, and the third is Cleon. Further in the comedy, another one is mentioned - the lamp merchant Hyperbolus. Indeed, after the death of Pericles, almost all the leaders of the demos, with the exception of Alcibiades, belonged to the trade and craft circles. These are newly formed politicians, traditionally called demagogues, who based their influence to a greater extent not on the authority of their position (mainly strategy), but on a direct appeal to the people. More from J. R. R. Tolkien.Groth noticed a shift in political influence from the people's prostate strategist to the prostate speaker, who often did not hold leading government positions. W. Connor believes that Cleon made a revolutionary revolution by his direct appeal to the people and thereby established a new style of politics, when a person "could achieve an outstanding position by expressing his readiness to protect the interests of the people, and, thanks to his success as an orator, become their leader - demagogue." On the other hand, successful generals aroused suspicion and fear among the masses. In this respect, the tragic fate of Pahetes, the conqueror of Lesbos, who was forced to commit suicide in court to avoid a guilty verdict, and the cautious behavior of Nikias, who always tried to belittle his merits, presenting them as a combination of circumstances and the will of the gods, are characteristic.
The social basis of the radical party was a mass of poor people who, as a rule, did not have the Zeugit qualification: day laborers, artisans, small merchants, as well as "ship people" - nautikos ochlos , as he called it Aristotle. Its ideology in domestic politics was based on providing each Athenian citizen with a solid subsistence minimum, through payment for the performance of civil duties, and salaries, which were achieved, firstly, at the expense of allies (in the form of phoros payments and the removal of clerks), and secondly, at the expense of rich people in Attica itself, who were forced to bear burdensome duties-liturgies and were considered unreliable already because of their wealth. However, the leaders of the People's Party were very wealthy people. Being, as we have said, great merchants, like Lysiklos and Cleon, or manufacturers, like Hyperbolus and Cleophon, they easily compensated for their losses by the advantages that the allied and foreign policy of their party brought them, as well as by the opportunity to increase the prices of the goods they supplied. The prohibition of the importation of corn and a number of other goods anywhere but Athens, trade duties, the obligation of the allies to report to Athens on a number of matters, etc., were very beneficial to the Athenian merchants and artisans. In addition, these merchants, whose capital was in circulation and living standards were more modest, found it easier to hide their income than their political opponents, whose fortune consisted in land holdings or money given to usury.
The leader of this party was Nikias, the son of Nikeratos. "Nothing better attests to the lack of talent that was felt in Athens at that time than the fact that such a person could occupy a leading position in the state and, with short interruptions, hold it until death," says Yu.Beloh. This assessment, in our opinion, is not entirely fair. Nicias did not possess the oratory of Pericles, was indecisive, superstitious, though he tried to appear even more superstitious; being an expert in military affairs, he did not seem to have any real generalship. However, he was a very subtle politician and, aware of his weaknesses, compensated for them with caution, calculation and money.
As one of the richest men in Athens (he owned the silver mines at Lavrion and a large number of rented slaves), Nicias outshone everyone by the generosity of his gymnasiarchies, choregia, and sacrifices, leaving monuments of his ambition in Athens and Delos. He was also willing to lend money to both his friends and possible enemies. Fearing informers and ingratiating himself with the people, Nicias, in the words of the comic poet Phrynichus, "walked forever cowering", showing a certain "appearance of timidity", knowing that the people "fear those who despise them and exalt those who fear them".
On the other hand, he himself, with the help of his friends and especially his pupil Hiero, tried to create for himself the image of a man who was concerned only with the good of the state and sacrificed his leisure, fortune and friends for this. Finally, Nicias always carefully avoided being a strategist in difficult and dangerous campaigns, carefully weighing everything and thinking most of all about his own safety. On the other hand, the enterprises he led usually ended in success, although in 425 on Sphacteria it was his caution that played a cruel joke on him. Thus, it must be admitted that Nicias was adept at using any political device to attract the people to him, and despite his caution, he was very ambitious. Plutarch says that the rich and distinguished citizens made him an opponent of Cleon, but this did not prevent him from enjoying the respect and favor of the people. Nikias was also respected in Sparta, knowing him as a noble and decent man.
Nikias is often seen as a follower of the Periclean strategy. Indeed, in the war, he followed the recommendations of Pericles: do not strive for further conquests during the war, avoid battles with superior enemy forces on land and actively act at sea, wait for the war-weary Sparta to incline to peace.
According to Thucydides, Nicias first served as a strategist in the summer of 427 during an expedition to Minoya, an island that occupied a strategic position opposite the Megarian harbor of Nisaea. Plutarch, however, dates the beginning of his career to an earlier time, saying that Nicias was promoted under Pericles, was a strategist with him, and held many of the highest public positions. This phrase makes it difficult to judge the exact time of his nomination. Yu.Beloch suggests that this happened between 439/8-434/3. Plutarch writes that the rich and distinguished citizens exposed Nicias as an opponent of Cleon.
It seems that Thucydides does not accidentally mention Nicias when discussing the fate of Mytilene: it is likely that he and his group really intensified the political struggle later than 429 BC. Thus, Plutarch's data do not contradict Thucydides ' message as much as it seems at first glance.
During this period, the main political differences are centered around the war itself, that is, the methods of its conduct and the permissible conditions for concluding peace. In fact, the peace and military parties were fighting in Athens. Nicias was known as a consistent advocate of peace; however, the military mood in Athens was strong, and the Nicias group needed to consolidate its position with active and successful fighting. The shortest way to peace was through war. Under the leadership of Nikias, the island of Minoia was captured. At the beginning of 426, he was a strategist in the campaign against Melos. However, neither Nikias nor his supporters managed to win decisive victories, but the radicals strongly strengthened their position. Cleon, who was a member of the Council in 428/27, developed an active career. He is usually referred to as the author of the introduction of an emergency tax-eisfora. He was also actively engaged in obtaining funds for waging war and collecting arrears, as Aristophanes says.
Cleon was elected as one of the Union treasurers for 427/26, thereby gaining a leading influence on the management of the Union finances. Cleon's conflict with the horsemen is also known, as reported by Aristophanes. It was caused by the accusation of treachery and desertion leveled by Cleon against the horsemen, as well as possibly his attempt to reduce the cost of maintaining the equestrian corps. During the solution of the Mytilene question, Cleon actively advocated reprisals against the inhabitants of the island.
Sending an expedition to Sicily in 427 is clearly the merit of Cleon and his group. The radicals always sought the west, but it can be said that Cleon continued the Western policy of Pericles in order to strengthen the position of Athens through alliances with the cities of Southern Italy, Sicily, and Kerkyra. The elections of 426/25 showed a decisive advantage for the radicals. Virtually none of the former strategists were re-elected, and their place was taken by representatives of the military party, including Pericles ' nephew, Hippocrates of Holarg. True, the" political and personal friend of Nikias " Lachetus was re-elected, but he remained in Sicily and could not have a tangible impact on political life in Athens.
In 425, the radicals had a brilliant opportunity to further strengthen their position. That year, Athenian forces led by Demosthenes defeated the Peloponnesian fleet at Pylos. At the same time, a detachment of 420 hoplites, including many Spartiates, was blocked on the island of Sphacteria. This led the Spartans (after all, the number of full-fledged Spartiates was already small at that time) to offer the Athenians to conclude peace, as far as Thucydides can understand, on the terms of the status quo , as well as a treaty of alliance and friendship. However, the radicals in power, with Cleon at their head, put forward such difficult conditions (the surrender of the Sphacteria garrison and the surrender of Nisaea, Pega, Troizena and Achaia to the Athenians) that negotiations were interrupted. Meanwhile, the siege dragged on, and the Athenian army suffered severe hardships, and winter was approaching, when the blockade of the island became impossible.
Apparently, the radical Democrats accused Demosthenes of allowing food supplies to be delivered to the besieged due to a lack of political credibility and deliberately not taking active actions, and his associates in Athens, and in particular Nikias, of not providing sufficient support to the army at Pylos. Then Nicias, who was probably supposed to be in command of the reinforcements heading for Sphacteria, suggested that Cleon should abandon the strategy in favor of leading the besieging forces himself. No doubt he was hoping to get rid of Cleon, who certainly had no military experience, and he was also following his own principle of avoiding enterprises that promised dubious success. However, contrary to all expectations, Cleon, acting in concert with Demosthenes, brilliantly completed the military operations in twenty days, as promised, forcing the surrender of the remaining Peloponnesians, taking 292 Lacedaemonian Hoplites prisoner. Among them were 120 Spartiates, whom the Athenians later used as hostages to ensure the security of their territory from the invasion of the Spartans.
Demosthenes ' position in these events is not entirely clear: Aristophanes in The Horsemen portrays him as an ally of Nicias, while Thucydides presents him more as a military commander, a fighting general who tries to stand outside politics. In any case, according to Thucydides, Demosthenes was the author of the plan to storm the Sphacterium, although Cleon claimed the laurels of the winner. Plutarch notes that Nicias did great harm to the state and to himself by allowing Cleon to become famous and increase his influence.
Even the successful actions of Nicias in Megaris and the Corinthian region could not improve the political situation of the moderates. However, the next year, 424, was extremely unsuccessful for the war party: the arrival of a fleet of 40 ships, in addition to the 20 already in Sicily, only frightened the Sicilian allies. As a result, in the spring of 424, the warring parties in Sicily signed a peace treaty on the terms of preserving the situation that existed at that time. In Thrace, the Athenians lost Amphipolis. All three generals, Eurymedon, Sophocles, and Pythodorus, who commanded in Sicily, were tried and sentenced to exile, and Eurymedon to a fine; and Thucydides, son of Olorus, who commanded at Amphipolis, was also banished. However, public opinion began to turn away from the military party. Peace negotiations were resumed, and a one-year truce was concluded, with a proposal for it submitted to the People's Assembly by Lachetus, and one of the three Athenian strategists who signed the agreement was Nikias, son of Nikeratos. However, the transfer of the city of Skiona to the Peloponnesian side, which occurred simultaneously with the conclusion of the truce, and the refusal of Brasidus, who commanded the Laconian troops in Thrace, to return it, again heated up the situation. Nicias with 50 triremes went to Scion and besieged the city, but could not take it. The truce in Greece itself was not broken, but it did not last. Chosen as strategos for 422/21, Cleon sailed with a fleet of 30 triremes to Thrace in the late summer of 422, hoping to recapture Amphipolis. Apparently, he himself believed in his generalship talent, but this time Cleon's luck was not favorable, there was no such master of military affairs as Demosthenes with him. As a result, the Athenians suffered a crushing defeat, losing about 600 men, including Cleon himself, who was killed while fleeing. Their opponent only lost 7 men, but one of them was Brasidus, who personally led the attack. The inhabitants of Amphipolis erected a tomb for him in the square and began to pay homage to him as a hero and founder of the city.
Thus, the two main supporters of the war in both warring camps were killed. This gave the peace party led by Nikias a unique chance, and they were not slow to seize it. On the other hand, the Spartans were also eager to make peace, driven to do so by the complications within the Peloponnesian Alliance itself and the fear of a Helot revolt, and most importantly, by the fact that the thirty-year peace with Argos was coming to an end. In addition, the Lacedaemonians sought to recover their prisoners of war from the island of Sphacteria. The peace party in Sparta was led by King Plistanactus, who was personally interested in peace, since, according to Thucydides, he hoped in this way to get rid of the constant attacks for having led an army away from the borders of Attica and was punished for this by exile. To put pressure on Athens, Sparta simultaneously ordered the allies to prepare for a march on Attica.
Nicias, for his part, used all his influence to persuade the Athenian people to make peace. From Plutarch it follows that he and his group spent a lot of effort on peaceful propaganda, and it is also known that he took care of the Spartan prisoners of war and thereby further endeared himself to the Lacedaemonians. After the victory at Delia and Amphipolis, the Spartans naturally agreed only to the status quo conditions , which was in itself a concession, because it meant abandoning the program with which Sparta began the war 10 years ago - the liberation of all Hellenes from Athenian domination, although we believe that even then such a goal for Sparta was rather declarative.
A 50-year peace treaty was concluded in the spring of 421; according to it, the Athenians were to return all their conquests in the Peloponnese, including Pylos, and the Spartans returned Amphipolis to them. Plataea remained in the hands of the Thebans, but as compensation for them, the Athenians could hold the Megarian harbor of Nisei. The cities of Chalkidiki and Thrace retained their autonomy, but were obliged to pay foros in the amount established by Aristides. Skion was handed over to the Athenians, but the besieged troops of the Spartans and allies were to receive the right of free passage. An exchange of prisoners of war was also envisaged. Plutarch adds to this the testimony of Theophrastus, according to which Nicias, by means of bribery, arranged the lot so that the Lacedaemonians would be the first to start fulfilling the terms of the contract.
The conservatives in Athens could be satisfied: Pericles ' military program was realized, and the Athenian power emerged from the war virtually unscathed. They did not want a decisive victory over Sparta, even if it were possible. However, of all the conditions of peace, only the agreement on the exchange of prisoners of war was actually fulfilled. The allies of Sparta, who received nothing as a result of the war, formed a new alliance at the suggestion of Corinth, which included the democratic Argos. The defensive alliance between Athens and Sparta did not yield practical results: Sparta was not able to regain Amphipolis, and the Athenians did not return Pylos. As a result, the election of Ephors in 420 was dominated by supporters of the war, on whose initiative Sparta resumed allied relations with Boeotia.
Now the military party has grown stronger in Athens, too. At its head were Hyperbolus of Periphedes and Alcibiades, son of Clinius. Their alliance formed an unstable coalition: each of the leaders, relying on a group of their adherents, pursued exclusively their own goals. The coalition was maintained as long as the goals matched, and then yesterday's allies could become deadly enemies. A striking example of this kind is the coalition formed in 415 against Alcibiades himself, which included representatives of almost all political movements, as we will discuss in more detail below.
Hyperbolus was Cleon's successor as leader of the Piraeus Party. He was a demagogue of the same type, a representative of the same social stratum and a supporter of the same political program as Cleon. He seems to have belonged to Cleon's inner circle, and was promoted by his activities in the courts of justice and in the Assembly of the people.
Alcibiades, on the other hand, was of extremely noble birth: on his father's side, he belonged to the Eupatrid family, which goes back to the mythical hero Euriscus, son of Aeanthus. His mother, Dinomakha, was descended from the family of Alcmaonids. After the death of his father Clinius in the Battle of Coronea, Alcibiades was raised in the house of Pericles, who was his guardian. He had everything necessary to play a leading political role in Athens: a sharp mind, an oratorical gift, a background, family connections and wealth, and also received a brilliant education from the sophists and Socrates. However, his political career was very different from the path usually followed by aristocrats who decided to enter politics, the path followed by his great relatives Cleisthenes and Pericles. The oligarchic and democratic doctrines themselves meant nothing to him. In politics, he always had only one goal - personal primacy, which he sought at any cost. "It is in the extreme, conscious individualism of Alcibiades that we should look for the basis of his notorious political unscrupulousness."
Acting in the political arena, he relied on a group of his supporters who were loyal to him personally. Plutarch speaks of hoi peri ton Alkibiaden petores, Alcibiades ' fellow orators who helped him promote the idea of the Sicilian Expedition. Subsequently, Alcibiades ' supporters (those who remained in the city after the case of the profanation of the mysteries) prepared for his return from exile and rehabilitation, and then, when he finally entered the land of Attica in 407, an armed group accompanied him from the harbor to the city. They were mostly his relatives and friends, who belonged to the same circle of Athenian aristocrats as himself. Thessalus, in his official complaint concerning the mysteries, calls Alcibiades ' accomplices hetairoi." Perhaps this group can be called his hetaeria, which was not, but could potentially become the core of a larger political organization-the party.
Family ties brought Alcibiades closer to Sparta (he was Sparta's proxenus in Athens), but the fact that the Spartans negotiated peace through Nicias in 421, as well as the realization that he had no chance of ousting Nicias from the leadership of the conservative party, pushed Alcibiades into the radical camp. The realization of his ambitious plans required extraordinary circumstances, required war. In addition, he saw that the development of events was contrary to the alliance with Sparta and favored the Athenian-Argos alliance.
In 420, Alcibiades was 30 years old, the age that allowed him to be elected strategos. Using the popular anger against conservative policies and using no means to compromise Nikias and the alliance with Sparta, he won his election as strategist. On his initiative, Athens entered into a defensive alliance with Argos, Mantinea and Elida for a period of 100 years. This alliance was defensive in form and offensive in content. Alcibiades tried with all his might to resume the war with Sparta: when, in the winter of 419, A.D. The Spartans assisted Epidaurus in the war with Argos, and Alcibiades had the people's assembly accuse them of violating the treaty. On his initiative, a Helot detachment was sent to Pylos to raid Laconia, then, while in Argos as an ambassador with the Athenian expeditionary force, he ensured that the Allies undertook a campaign to Arcadia. The result of this enterprise was the brutal defeat of the Allies at Mantinea in 418.
The defeat at Mantinea destroyed all that Alcibiades ' policy had achieved, and the cause of the military party seemed lost: Argos concluded a 50-year peace treaty with Sparta, an oligarchy was established in Argos itself, and the same thing happened in Achaia; Mantinea and Elis were also forced to make peace. Never before has Sparta's hegemony in the Peloponnese been more complete.
We agree with Yu's opinion.Belokha says that Alcibiades was not elected strategos for 418 and acted in Argos largely on his own initiative, while Nicias was at the head of the Athenian state. This explains both the weak support of Athens for its supporters in the Peloponnese, and the intensity of passions around the figures of Alcibiades and Nicias, which found its way out in ostracism.
The initiator of the ostracophoria was the Hyperbolus from the Periphery already mentioned. Sources do not skimp on epithets in relation to him; for example, Andocides, in a passage preserved by the scholiast Aristophanes, calls Hyperbolus the son of a monetarian slave, a foreigner and a barbarian, of whom he is even ashamed to speak. However, judging by the ferocity of this criticism and the attention of comedians, Hyperbolus played a prominent role in political life. Most scholars agree with Plutarch's view that Hyperbolus, in proposing ostracism, expected to benefit from it in any case, getting rid of one of his main competitors: Nicias, the leader of the conservatives, or Alcibiades, who relegated him to secondary roles in the democratic party and caused irritation and distrust of the radicals due to his unpredictable behavior and lifestyle. However, the situation turned out to be quite curious: both sides, and especially Alcibiades, had good reasons to fear ostracism, so they preferred to conclude an agreement between themselves. Alcibiades and his group broke with extreme democracy and joined Nicias. They formed a coalition against Hyperbole. As a result, he himself was ostracized and left for the island of Samos, where he was killed in 411.. We do not know the exact date of the ostracism, but it is most likely that it occurred in 417, although it is possible to date it to 418 and 416, and G. Bengtson even suggests dating it to 415.
Plutarch, in his biography of Nicias, ends the story of ostracism with a reference to Theophrastus, according to which the main opponent of Alcibiades at that time was not Nicias, but Phaeacus. In his biography of Alcibiades, he dwells on this topic in more detail, saying that Alcibiades eclipsed all the political figures who were at that time in Athens, with the exception of Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Phaeacus, son of Erasistratus, who, like Alcibiades, was a noble family and was just beginning his political career. Diogenes of Laertes calls Phaeacus a general, and Thucydides reports that in 421 BC, Phaeacus was a general. Phaeacus, son of Erasistratus, led a diplomatic mission to Sicily and southern Italy to seek allies in the war against Syracuse. Plutarch relates that Phaeacus was inferior to Alcibiades in oratory, and also that he was the author of a speech against Alcibiades, in which he accused him of using the state's gold and silver vessels used in solemn processions during the meal. Zh.Carcopino suggests that Phaeacus was an ally of Nikias. According to Plutarch, Alcibiades may have united three groups - his own, Phaeacus, and Nicias - to direct their activity against Hyperbole. This suggests that at least four significant political figures were involved in the ostracism situation: Alcibiades, Nicias, Phaeacus, and Hyperbolus. The thesis of Phaeacus ' involvement in this ostracism is also confirmed by several ostracons bearing his name. However, there is also an ostracon named Cleophon, dating back to the end of the fifth century BC and probably to this ostracism. There is also an assumption that Cleophon and Hyperbolus formed a coalition at that time, but there is no evidence for this theory.
The events that have taken place have clearly shown that ostracism has outlived its usefulness, finally turning into a tool of struggle in the hands of political groups. Ostracism Hyperbole was the last time the law on ostracism was applied in practice, although it was legally preserved in the future.
After the expulsion of Hyperbolus, Nicias and Alcibiades appear to have both been chosen as strategists, although Alcibiades was apparently now a dependent ally of Nicias. The political situation, however, did not favour the conservatives: Sparta failed to maintain its position in the Argos won the people's party, democracy was restored, and Argos again entered into an Alliance with Athens; the campaign Nikia under Amphipolis was unsuccessful, mainly due to the transition to the side of the Spartans of the Macedonian king Perdiki; finally, in A. D. 416. When Selinuntes attacked Aegestus, which was allied with Athens, she turned to Athens for help. At the same time, war resumed with Corinth, and in fact with Sparta, which, irritated by the activities of the Athenian garrison in Pylos, allowed its citizens as private individuals to raid the Athenians.
The prospect of an expedition to Sicily caused great indignation in Athens. From a formal point of view, the Athenians had every right to intervene in Sicilian affairs in order to support Aegestus and help the Leontians restore their statehood, lost as early as 422.On the contrary, if Athens did not support its allies, it would completely lose its position in the western Mediterranean. Many, however, were ready to go for it. Nikias strongly opposed the idea of an expedition, emphasizing the need to retake Halkidiki first, as well as the complexity of the foreign policy situation in Greece itself for Athens, but he was in the minority even in his own party. Thucydides reports that the enthusiasm of the majority for the Sicilian expedition was so great that even those who disagreed were silent for fear of being perceived as ill-intentioned citizens. The idea of a march to the West and extensive conquests reached all strata of society, the democrats made every effort to promote it, but most of all did Alcibiades to promote the project and give it that breadth and perspective that still amazes the imagination (the subjugation of Sicily, Italy, Carthage and, ultimately, the establishment of domination over the entire Mediterranean), of course.
An enterprise of this kind gave Alcibiades the opportunity to fully display his talents and achieve the position of the first man in Athens, or even higher: the creator of an unprecedented Mediterranean empire - a brilliant and incredibly attractive mirage, especially for such a passionate and ambitious nature. Thucydides, however, cites another reason for Alcibiades ' desire for war: the desire to improve his fortune, which has been shaken by excessive spending.
According to Plutarch, Alcibiades, even before the national assembly, in which the question of war was to be decided, managed to set up the mass of the people in such a way that the decision was predetermined in advance. Apparently, at this point, Alcibiades was acting in concert with the radicals, breaking the alliance with Nicias. Plutarch mentions a certain leader of the people, Demostratus, who was the most instigator of the war, at whose suggestion the strategists Nikias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus were given unlimited powers in the preparation and command of the army, and thus put an end to the discussion of this question. Thucydides, without naming names, confirms this report.
The squadron was almost ready to leave when an event occurred that rocked the whole of Athens - in one night most of the hermas, stone images of Hermes that stood at the intersections of roads and at the entrances to houses, were mutilated. The cult of Hermes was one of the most revered in democratic Athens, and although the antics of drunken youth, sometimes accompanied by sacrilege, were not uncommon, the scale of the desecration of shrines made a strong impression on the Athenians, causing indignation and fear. This incident was seen as a bad omen for the campaign, and also as a plot to overthrow democracy and overthrow the state, since it was clearly the work of many accomplices. On the same day that it became known about the incident, the Council and the people appointed an investigation into the case and set rewards for denouncing it.
Thus began the process, infamous in history under the name of the case of germocopids. Apparently, it was originally the scene of a personal and political vendetta. Among the main actors who vigorously promoted this process, we meet such figures as Pisander, who at that time wore the guise of a democrat, and later became one of the most active participants in the coup of 411, Charicles, also a supporter of the people's party, and in the future one of the Thirty tyrants, the demagogue Cleonimus, a supporter of Cleon, and the staunch democrat Androcles, the sworn enemy of Alcibiades.
Rewards for denunciation were established according to the proposal of Cleonymus and Pisander. Apparently, a reward of 10,000 drachmas was offered by Pisander, and then Cleonymus made a proposal to establish a reward of 1,000 drachmas for a second denunciation. A decree of the People's Assembly was also passed, according to which anyone, be he a citizen, a metek, a foreigner or a slave, can with impunity denounce any sacrilege, even if he himself was an accomplice in it. The case thus expanded to cover any religious offense.