Oligarchic Movement in Athens

The formation of the oligarchic movement was a reaction to the intense socio-political and economic development of the Athenian polis, which led to a significant decline in the influence of the aristocracy in Athens in the first half of the 5th century BC.

While the primary form of aristocratic association was the kinship group, whose members were connected by blood ties and religious rituals, the supporters of oligarchy, who were largely aristocrats preserving traditional customs and values, were mainly united by belonging to a group of like-minded individuals, known as hetairiai or larger political factions. The principle of corporatism was a defining characteristic of the Athenian oligarchic movement.

Thucydides writes that none of Pericles' successors stood out as statesmen, but each sought preeminence, often sacrificing state interests to cater to the populace. In Aristophanes' Knights, there is a peculiar list of politicians leading the people's party. In the prophecy of Bakis, merchants are listed: one in hemp, another in cattle, and a third in hides. The first refers to Eucrates, the second to Lysicles, and the third to Cleon. Later in the play, another figure is mentioned, Hyperbolus, a lamp merchant. Indeed, after Pericles' death, nearly all the leaders of the demos, with the exception of Alcibiades, came from commercial and artisanal circles. These were politicians of a new formation, traditionally called demagogues, who based their influence more on direct appeal to the people than on the authority of their office (primarily as strategoi). As observed by J.G. Grote, political influence shifted from the people's prostates-strategos to the prostates-orator, who often did not hold high state office. W. Connor believes that Cleon initiated a revolutionary change with his direct appeal to the people, establishing a new political style where one could achieve prominence by demonstrating a willingness to defend the people's interests and, through rhetorical success, become their leader—a demagogue. On the other hand, successful military commanders were often viewed with suspicion and fear by the masses. This is evident in the tragic fate of Paches, the conqueror of Lesbos, who committed suicide in court to avoid a guilty verdict, and in Nicias' cautious behavior, where he consistently downplayed his achievements, attributing them to chance and the will of the gods.

The social base of the radical party consisted of the masses of the poor, who typically did not meet the zeugitai property requirement: day laborers, artisans, small traders, as well as the "ship's people" (nautikos ochlos) as Aristotle called them. Its ideology in domestic policy was based on providing every Athenian citizen with a guaranteed minimum income through payment for performing civic duties and salaries, achieved firstly at the expense of allies (in the form of phoros payments and the establishment of cleruchies), and secondly, at the expense of the wealthy in Attica, who were burdened with costly public services—liturgies—and were considered unreliable simply because of their wealth. However, the leaders of the people's party were themselves quite wealthy. As we have mentioned, being large merchants like Lysicles and Cleon, or manufacturers like Hyperbolus and Cleophon, they easily compensated for their losses through the benefits brought by their party’s foreign and alliance policies, as well as the ability to raise prices on the goods they supplied. Prohibiting the import of grain and certain other goods anywhere but Athens, imposing trade duties, requiring allies to come to Athens for certain matters, and so on, were highly advantageous for Athenian merchants and craftsmen. Moreover, these merchants, whose capital was in circulation and whose living standards were more modest, found it easier to conceal their income than their political opponents, whose wealth was in land holdings or money lent at interest.

The leader of this party became Nicias, the son of Niceratus. "Nothing better demonstrates the lack of talent felt in Athens at the time than the fact that such a man could occupy a leading position in the state and, with few interruptions, hold it until his death," says J. Beloch about him. This assessment, in our view, is not entirely fair. Nicias lacked Pericles' oratorical skill, was indecisive, superstitious, and even pretended to be more superstitious than he was; despite being knowledgeable in military affairs, he apparently did not possess genuine military talent. However, he was a very astute politician and, aware of his weaknesses, compensated for them with caution, calculation, and wealth.

As one of the wealthiest men in Athens (he owned silver mines in Laurion and a large number of slaves rented out for work), Nicias overshadowed everyone with the generosity of his gymnasiarchies, choregies, and sacrifices, leaving monuments to his ambition in Athens and on Delos. He was also willing to lend money to both friends and potential enemies. Fearing informers and currying favor with the people, Nicias, as the comic poet Phrynichus put it, "always walked hunched over," demonstrating a certain "appearance of timidity," knowing that the people "fear those who despise them and exalt those who fear them."

On the other hand, with the help of friends and especially his protégé Hiero, he sought to create an image of himself as a man concerned only with the state's welfare, sacrificing his leisure, wealth, and friends for it. Finally, Nicias always carefully avoided being a strategos in difficult and dangerous campaigns, meticulously weighing everything and thinking mainly about his safety. However, the enterprises he led usually ended successfully, although in 425 BC, his caution backfired on him at Sphacteria. Thus, it must be acknowledged that Nicias skillfully used any political means to attract the people to himself and, despite his caution, was quite ambitious. Plutarch notes that wealthy and noble citizens set him up as an opponent to Cleon, but this did not prevent him from enjoying the respect and favor of the people. Nicias was also respected in Sparta, where he was known as a noble and decent man.

Nicias is often seen as a continuer of Pericles' strategy. Indeed, in war, he followed Pericles' recommendations: not to pursue further conquests during the war, avoid battles with superior enemy forces on land, and act aggressively at sea, waiting for a war-weary Sparta to incline toward peace.

According to Thucydides, Nicias first acted as a strategos in the summer of 427 BC during an expedition to Minoa, an island of strategic importance opposite the Megarian harbor of Nisaea. However, Plutarch dates the beginning of his career to an earlier time, saying that Nicias rose to prominence during Pericles' time, was a strategos with him, and held many high state offices. From this phrase, it is difficult to judge the exact time of his rise. J. Beloch suggests that it occurred between 439/8-434/3 BC. Plutarch writes that wealthy and noble citizens set Nicias up as an opponent to Cleon.

Apparently, Thucydides does not mention Nicias when discussing the fate of Mytilene, probably because he and his group intensified their political struggle after 429 BC. Thus, Plutarch’s account does not contradict Thucydides’ report as much as it might seem at first glance.

During this period, the main political disagreements focused on the war itself, specifically on how it should be conducted and the acceptable terms for peace. Essentially, the peaceful and war factions were in conflict in Athens. Nicias was known as a consistent advocate for peace; however, war sentiments in Athens were strong, and Nicias' group needed to strengthen their position through active and successful military actions. The shortest path to peace led through war. Under Nicias' leadership, the island of Minoa was captured. At the beginning of 426 BC, he led a campaign to Melos. However, neither Nicias nor his supporters managed to secure decisive victories, while the radicals significantly strengthened their position. Cleon, who was a member of the Council in 428/27 BC, engaged in active political activity. He is usually credited with introducing the emergency tax—eisphora. He was also actively involved in raising funds for the war effort and collecting arrears, as Aristophanes mentions.

Cleon was elected one of the allied treasurers for 427/26 BC, gaining a leading influence over the management of allied finances. There is also mention of a conflict between Cleon and the cavalry, reported by Aristophanes. This was triggered by Cleon's accusation of treason and desertion against the cavalry, as well as possibly his attempt to cut expenses on the upkeep of the cavalry corps. During the resolution of the Mytilenean issue, Cleon actively advocated for the punishment of the island's inhabitants.

The dispatch of the expedition to Sicily in 427 BC was clearly Cleon’s and his group's achievement. The radicals always aimed westward, although it can be said that, by seeking to strengthen Athens' position through alliances with cities in Southern Italy, Sicily, and Corcyra, Cleon continued Pericles’ western policy. The elections for 426/25 BC showed a decisive advantage for the radicals. Almost none of the strategoi of that time were re-elected, and their places were taken by representatives of the war party, including Pericles' nephew, Hippocrates of Cholarges. However, Nicias' "political and personal friend" Laches was re-elected, but he remained in Sicily and could not significantly influence political life in Athens.

In 425 BC, radicals had a brilliant opportunity to further strengthen their position. That year, Athenian forces under Demosthenes defeated the Peloponnesian fleet at Pylos. Consequently, a detachment of 420 hoplites, including many Spartans, found themselves blockaded on the island of Sphacteria. This compelled the Spartans, whose number of full citizens had already dwindled significantly, to propose a peace to the Athenians, apparently on status quo terms, along with an alliance and friendship treaty, as understood from Thucydides. However, the radicals in power, led by Cleon, demanded such harsh terms (the surrender of the Sphacterian garrison and the cession of Nisaea, Pegae, Troezen, and Achaea to Athens) that negotiations were broken off. The siege dragged on, with the Athenian army suffering severe hardships, compounded by the approaching winter, which would make the blockade of the island impossible.

It seems that the radical democrats accused Demosthenes of allowing supplies to reach the besieged due to insufficient political loyalty and of deliberately not taking active measures. His allies in Athens, particularly Nicias, were also blamed for not providing adequate support to the army at Pylos. In response, Nicias, who was likely supposed to command reinforcements heading to Sphacteria, proposed handing over the strategy to Cleon, so that he could lead the besieging forces himself. Undoubtedly, Nicias hoped to rid himself of Cleon, who lacked military experience, and followed his principle of avoiding ventures with uncertain outcomes. However, against all expectations, Cleon, acting together with Demosthenes, brilliantly concluded the military actions within twenty days, as promised, forcing the remaining Peloponnesians to surrender and capturing 292 Spartan hoplites. Among them were 120 Spartans, whom the Athenians later used as hostages to secure their territory from Spartan invasions.

The role of Demosthenes in these events is not entirely clear: Aristophanes, in "The Knights," portrays him as an ally of Nicias, while Thucydides presents him more as a military commander striving to stay out of politics. In any case, according to Thucydides, it was Demosthenes who devised the plan to storm Sphacteria, although Cleon claimed the victor's laurels. Plutarch remarks that Nicias caused great harm to the state and to himself by allowing Cleon to gain fame and strengthen his influence.

Even Nicias' successful actions in Megara and around Corinth could not improve the political standing of the moderates. However, the following year, 424 BC, was extremely unfavorable for the war party: the arrival of a fleet of 40 ships, in addition to the 20 already in Sicily, only frightened the Sicilian allies. As a result, in the spring of 424 BC, the warring parties in Sicily signed a peace treaty, preserving the existing situation. In Thrace, the Athenians lost Amphipolis. All three strategoi—Eurymedon, Sophocles, and Pythodorus—who commanded in Sicily were put on trial and sentenced to exile, with Eurymedon also fined. Thucydides, son of Olorus, who commanded at Amphipolis, was also exiled. Nevertheless, public opinion began to turn away from the war party. Peace negotiations resumed, resulting in a one-year truce, with the proposal being brought before the assembly by Laches, and Nicias, son of Niceratus, was one of the three Athenian strategoi who signed the agreement. However, the defection of Scione to the Peloponnesians, coinciding with the truce, and Brasidas' refusal to return it, who commanded the Spartan forces in Thrace, reignited tensions. Nicias, with 50 triremes, besieged Scione but was unable to capture it. The truce within Greece was not violated but was not extended either. Elected strategos for 422/21 BC, Cleon, at the end of summer 422 BC, set sail with a fleet of 30 triremes for Thrace, hoping to retake Amphipolis. He seems to have believed in his military prowess, but this time luck did not favor Cleon, as he lacked a military expert like Demosthenes. As a result, the Athenians suffered a crushing defeat, losing about 600 men, including Cleon himself, who was killed while fleeing. Their opponent lost only seven men, but one of them was Brasidas, who personally led the attack. The inhabitants of Amphipolis erected a tomb for him in the square and began to honor him as a hero and founder of the city.

Thus, the two main proponents of war in both hostile camps were killed, giving the peace party, led by Nicias, a unique opportunity, which they quickly seized. On the other hand, the Spartans also sought peace, motivated by complications within the Peloponnesian League itself and the fear of a helot uprising, and most importantly, by the approaching end of the thirty-year peace with Argos. Additionally, the Lacedaemonians were keen to retrieve their prisoners of war from Sphacteria. The peace party in Sparta was led by King Pleistoanax, who had a personal interest in peace, as Thucydides notes, hoping to rid himself of constant attacks for once leading the army away from the borders of Attica, for which he had been punished with exile. To pressure Athens, Sparta simultaneously ordered its allies to prepare for a campaign in Attica.

Nicias, for his part, used all his influence to persuade the Athenian people towards peace. According to Plutarch, he and his group spent considerable effort on peace propaganda; it is also known that he cared for the Spartan prisoners of war, which further endeared him to the Lacedaemonians. After the victories at Delium and Amphipolis, the Spartans were naturally only willing to accept status quo terms, which was itself a concession, as this meant abandoning the program with which Sparta had begun the war 10 years earlier—the liberation of all Greeks from Athenian domination, although we believe that even then such a goal for Sparta was more declarative.

A peace treaty for 50 years was concluded in the spring of 421 BC; under its terms, the Athenians were to return all their conquests in the Peloponnese, including Pylos, while the Spartans would return Amphipolis. Plataea remained in Theban hands, but in compensation, the Athenians were allowed to retain the Megarian port of Nisaea. The cities of Chalcidice and Thrace retained autonomy but were obliged to pay the tribute set by Aristides. Scione was handed over to the Athenians' discretion, although the Spartan and allied forces besieged there were to be granted safe passage. An exchange of prisoners of war was also agreed upon. Plutarch adds Theophrastus' testimony, according to which Nicias manipulated the drawing of lots through bribery so that the Lacedaemonians would be the first to fulfill the treaty's conditions.

The conservatives in Athens could be satisfied: Pericles' military program had been fulfilled, and the Athenian state emerged from the war virtually unscathed. They did not desire a decisive victory over Sparta, even if it had been possible. However, of all the terms of peace, only the agreement on the exchange of prisoners of war was actually implemented. Sparta's allies, having gained nothing from the war, formed a new alliance at Corinth's suggestion, which included democratic Argos. The defensive alliance between Athens and Sparta yielded no practical results: Sparta was unable to recover Amphipolis, and the Athenians did not return Pylos. As a result, in the ephor elections of 420 BC, the war supporters prevailed, leading to Sparta renewing its alliance with Boeotia.

Now, the war party in Athens also gained strength. At its head was Hyperbolus of Periphetides and Alcibiades, son of Clinias. Their alliance formed an unstable coalition: each leader, relying on his group of supporters, pursued only personal goals. The coalition lasted as long as their goals coincided, but then the former allies could become deadly enemies. A vivid example of this is the coalition formed in 415 BC against Alcibiades himself, which included representatives of almost all political factions, as we will discuss in more detail below.

Hyperbolus succeeded Cleon as leader of the Piraeus party. He was a demagogue of the same type, from the same social class, and a supporter of the same political program as Cleon. He probably belonged to Cleon's inner circle and rose to prominence through his activities in the courts and the assembly.

Alcibiades, on the other hand, came from a very noble lineage: on his father's side, he belonged to the Eupatridae, a family tracing its roots back to the mythical hero Eurysaces, son of Ajax. His mother, Dinomache, was from the Alcmaeonidae family. After the death of his father Cleinias at the Battle of Coronea, Alcibiades was raised in the house of Pericles, who was his guardian. He had everything needed to play a leading political role in Athens: a sharp mind, oratory skills, noble birth, influential connections, and wealth, as well as an excellent education under sophists and Socrates. However, his political career sharply differed from the usual path followed by aristocrats who chose to engage in politics, the path taken by his illustrious relatives Cleisthenes and Pericles. For Alcibiades, the oligarchic and democratic doctrines meant nothing in themselves. His sole aim in politics was always personal supremacy, which he pursued at any cost. "It is in the extreme, conscious individualism of Alcibiades that we should seek the basis of his notorious political unprincipledness."

In his political endeavors, he relied on a group of supporters loyal to him personally. Plutarch speaks of the hoi peri ton Alkibiaden petores, orators who were Alcibiades' associates, helping him promote the idea of the Sicilian expedition. Later, Alcibiades' supporters (those who remained in the city after the affair of the profanation of the mysteries) prepared his return from exile and rehabilitation, and when he finally set foot on Attic soil in 407 BC, they accompanied him from the harbor to the city with an armed group. These were mainly his relatives and friends, belonging to the same circle of Athenian aristocrats as himself. Thessalus, in an official complaint related to the profanation of the mysteries, called Alcibiades' accomplices hetairoi—a group that could be considered his heteria, which was not yet, but potentially could have become, the core of a more extensive political organization—a party.

Family ties brought Alcibiades closer to Sparta (he was a proxenus of Sparta in Athens), but the fact that the Spartans conducted peace negotiations through Nicias in 421 BC, and his understanding that he had no chance of pushing Nicias aside from the leadership of the conservative party, drove Alcibiades into the camp of the radicals. The realization of his ambitious plans required extraordinary circumstances, required war. Moreover, he saw that the development of events contradicted the alliance with Sparta and favored an Athenian-Argive alliance.

In 420 BC, Alcibiades turned 30—the age at which he could be elected strategos. Taking advantage of the people's irritation with the conservatives' policies and not hesitating to use any means to discredit Nicias and the alliance with Sparta, he managed to get himself elected as strategos. At his initiative, Athens concluded a defensive alliance with Argos, Mantinea, and Elis for 100 years. This alliance was defensive in form and offensive in content. Alcibiades sought by all means to renew the war with Sparta: when in the winter of 419 BC the Spartans aided Epidaurus in the war against Argos, Alcibiades managed to accuse them of violating the treaty in the popular assembly. At his initiative, a detachment of helots was sent to Pylos to raid Laconia, and then, while in Argos as an ambassador with the Athenian expeditionary corps, he persuaded the allies to launch a campaign in Arcadia. The result of this venture was a crushing defeat of the allies at Mantinea in 418 BC.

The defeat at Mantinea nullified all that Alcibiades' policy had achieved, and the cause of the war party seemed finally lost: Argos made a peace treaty with Sparta for 50 years, an oligarchy was established in Argos itself, the same happened in Achaea; Mantinea and Elis were also forced to make peace. Never before had Sparta's hegemony in the Peloponnese been so complete.

We agree with the opinion of Julius Beloch that Alcibiades was not elected strategos for 418 BC and acted in Argos largely on his own initiative, while Nicias was at the head of the Athenian state. This explains both the weak support by Athens of its allies in the Peloponnese and the intense rivalry between Alcibiades and Nicias, which culminated in the ostracism.

The initiator of the ostracophoria was the aforementioned Hyperbolus from Perithidae. Sources are not stingy with epithets towards him; for example, Andocides, in a preserved fragment of a speech by a scholiast of Aristophanes, calls Hyperbolus the son of a slave-coin-maker, a foreigner, and a barbarian, about whom he is ashamed even to speak. However, judging by the fierceness of this criticism and the attention of comedians, Hyperbolus played a prominent role in political life. Most scholars agree with Plutarch's opinion that Hyperbolus, by proposing ostracism, hoped to benefit regardless of the outcome, by eliminating one of his main competitors: Nicias, leader of the conservatives, or Alcibiades, who had pushed him into secondary roles in the democratic party and provoked irritation and distrust among radicals due to his unpredictable behavior and lifestyle. However, the matter turned out to be quite comical: both sides, and especially Alcibiades, had good reasons to fear ostracism, so they preferred to make an agreement between themselves. Alcibiades and his faction broke with the extreme democracy and joined Nicias. They formed a coalition against Hyperbolus. As a result, he himself was ostracized and went to the island of Samos, where he was killed in 411 BC. The exact date of the ostracism is unknown, but it most likely occurred in 417 BC, though dates of 418 and 416 BC are also possible, and G. Bengtson even proposes 415 BC.

Plutarch, in his biography of Nicias, concludes the story of ostracism with a reference to Theophrastus, who claims that Alcibiades' main rival at that time was not Nicias, but rather Phæax. In his biography of Alcibiades, Plutarch delves deeper into this topic, stating that Alcibiades eclipsed all political figures in Athens at the time, with the exception of Nicias, son of Niceratus, and Phæax, son of Erasistratus, who, like Alcibiades, was of noble birth and was just beginning his political career. Diogenes Laertius refers to Phæax as a general, and Thucydides reports that in 421 BC, Phæax, son of Erasistratus, led a diplomatic mission to Sicily and Southern Italy to seek allies in the war against Syracuse. Plutarch mentions that Phæax was less skilled in oratory than Alcibiades and that he authored a speech against Alcibiades, accusing him of using state-owned gold and silver vessels during banquets that were meant for official processions. J. Carcopino suggests that Phæax was an ally of Nicias. According to Plutarch, Alcibiades may have united the three factions—his own, Phæax's, and Nicias's—directing their efforts against Hyperbolus. Thus, it can be concluded that at least four significant political figures were involved in the situation surrounding the ostracism: Alcibiades, Nicias, Phæax, and Hyperbolus. The thesis regarding Phæax's involvement in this ostracism is also supported by several ostraka bearing his name. Additionally, there is an ostrakon with the name of Cleophon, dating to the end of the 5th century BC and likely related to this ostracism. There is also speculation that Cleophon and Hyperbolus formed a coalition at that time, though there is no evidence to support this theory.

The events that occurred clearly demonstrated that ostracism had outlived its purpose, becoming merely a tool for political factions. The ostracism of Hyperbolus was the last instance of the law being applied in practice, although it legally remained in effect thereafter.

After the exile of Hyperbolus, both Nicias and Alcibiades were likely elected as strategoi, though Alcibiades now appeared to be a subordinate ally of Nicias. However, the political situation was unfavorable to conservatives: Sparta failed to maintain its dominance—Argos saw the victory of the popular party, democracy was restored, and Argos rejoined the alliance with Athens; Nicias's campaign near Amphipolis was unsuccessful, mainly due to the defection of Macedonian King Perdiccas to the Spartans; finally, in 416 BC, when Selinus attacked Egesta, an ally of Athens, the latter sought help from Athens. At the same time, the war with Corinth resumed, effectively also with Sparta, which, irritated by the activities of the Athenian garrison in Pylos, allowed its citizens to raid Athenians as private individuals.

The prospect of an expedition to Sicily caused great unrest in Athens. Formally, the Athenians had every right to intervene in Sicilian affairs to support Egesta and help the Leontines restore their statehood, which they had lost in 422 BC. Conversely, if Athens did not support its allies, it would completely lose its position in the western Mediterranean. Many, however, were willing to accept this loss. Nicias strongly opposed the idea of the expedition, emphasizing the need to first reclaim Chalcidice and the complexity of the foreign policy situation in Greece itself, but he found himself in the minority even within his own party. Thucydides reports that the enthusiasm for the Sicilian expedition was so great among the majority that even dissenters remained silent for fear of being considered disloyal citizens. The idea of a campaign to the West and expansive conquests captivated all strata of society; the democrats made every effort to promote it, but it was Alcibiades who did the most to advance the project and give it the breadth and perspective that still astonishes today (subjugation of Sicily, Italy, Carthage, and ultimately the establishment of dominance over the entire Mediterranean). Such an enterprise offered Alcibiades the opportunity to fully showcase his talents and achieve the status of the foremost man in Athens, if not higher: the creator of an unprecedented Mediterranean empire—a brilliant and incredibly alluring mirage, especially for such a passionate and ambitious nature. Thucydides, however, mentions another reason for Alcibiades' desire for war: the need to restore his fortunes, which had been depleted by extravagant spending.

An enterprise of this kind gave Alcibiades the opportunity to fully display his talents and achieve the position of the first man in Athens, or even higher: the creator of an unprecedented Mediterranean empire - a brilliant and incredibly attractive mirage, especially for such a passionate and ambitious nature. Thucydides, however, cites another reason for Alcibiades ' desire for war: the desire to improve his fortune, which has been shaken by excessive spending.

According to Plutarch, Alcibiades, even before the popular assembly where the decision about the war was to be made, had already swayed the masses so that the outcome was predetermined. It seems that at this point, Alcibiades was acting in concert with the radicals, having broken off his alliance with Nicias. Plutarch mentions a certain popular leader, Demostratus, who was the most fervent advocate for war, and who proposed that the strategoi—Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus—be granted unlimited powers in preparing and commanding the army, thus concluding the debate on the matter. Thucydides, although not mentioning names, confirms this account.

The fleet was nearly ready to depart when an event occurred that shocked all of Athens—in one night, most of the herms, stone statues of Hermes placed at crossroads and the entrances to houses, were mutilated. The cult of Hermes was one of the most revered in democratic Athens, and while drunken revelries sometimes involved sacrilege, the scale of this desecration deeply impressed the Athenians, causing outrage and fear. The incident was seen as a bad omen for the expedition, and additionally, as part of a conspiracy aimed at a coup to overthrow the democracy, as the event clearly involved many participants. On the same day that the news broke, the Council and the people initiated an investigation into the matter and set rewards for informants.

Thus began the process infamously known in history as the case of the hermocopids. It appears that from the outset, it became a battleground for personal and political vendettas. Among the main figures energetically pushing this process were such individuals as Pisander, at that time posing as a democrat and later one of the most active participants in the coup of 411 BC; Charicles, also a supporter of the popular party and later one of the Thirty Tyrants; the demagogue Cleonymus, an ally of Cleon; and the staunch democrat Androcles, a sworn enemy of Alcibiades.

The rewards for informants were established according to proposals by Cleonymus and Pisander. It seems that Pisander proposed a reward of 10,000 drachmas, after which Cleonymus introduced a proposal to set a reward of 1,000 drachmas for a second informant. There was also a decree passed by the popular assembly that allowed anyone, whether citizen, metic, foreigner, or slave, to inform on any sacrilege without penalty to themselves, even if they had been an accomplice. Thus, the case expanded, encompassing any violation of religious laws.

Related topics

Ancient Greece - Hellas, Aristotle, Athenian Democracy, Greek Tyranny

Literature

• Vladimirsky M. Y. The Athenian Oligarchy